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Mercy Killing: Three’s a Crowd? 
The partial defence of loss of self control, contained within the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, 
replaced provocation as an emotion-based defence which operates to reduce murder to 
manslaughter. It was essentially enacted to encompass two types of cases. Firstly, those of excessive 
force self-defence, where a defendant acted from a fear of serious violence, to provide a partial 
defence route for situations such as battered women who kill their abuser. Secondly, those of 
imperfect angry retributive actions where a defendant had an overwhelming sense of being 
wronged. The new partial defence’s remit was to end the doctrine of the retaliatory defence of 
provocation by replacing it with a defence which acknowledged a broader spectrum of emotions. 
This article questions why the emotion-based situation of compassionate killers was not included 
within this revamp of a tired and out-dated defence, and provides a pathway to include cases of 
mercy killing and compassionate killings within the ambit of the loss of control partial defence. In 
this article, mercy killing refers to cases where a family member or partner has killed a loved one to 
end their pain and suffering. This includes both cases which involve express consent1 or requests by 
the victim and those which do not.2 
Anger always had a premium over other emotions under the provocation defence3 and this has been 
retained under the new partial defence of loss of control, with fear being the new addition to the 
emotions which could make out a successful defence.4 However, compassion is a feeling that 
appears to remain outside the range of emotions covered in the new partial defence of loss of 
control.5 Unfortunately, because provocation was not the only partial defence to be revamped by 
the Coroners and Justice Act 20096, killings of compassion, or so-called mercy killings, might now 
have no defence at all. It seems absurd that the emotion of compassion has been overlooked, when 
it is compassion itself that is the foundation for the partial defences as a concession to the human 
experience: 
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“As a general matter, when society excuses an offender it demonstrates its compassion for him”.7 
Excuse defences exist because society views compassion as a moral and respectable virtue and seeks 
to act upon this in providing a just legal system8. Considering this, acting compassionately should 
surely be excused as much as acting under the stress of fear or anger9. 
The intention here is certainly not to provide any kind of full discussion on the partial defence of 
diminished responsibility, but merely to consider if mercy killings, which were previously 
shoehorned into that defence, might now need to be covered by another partial defence. If so, it is 
relevant to debate if there is any chance that loss of control could fit the bill. It is also both intriguing 
and essential to discuss why some categories of cases or types of defendant are elevated above 
others when it comes to defences. The partial defences to murder provide a concession to human 
frailty against the backdrop of a very harsh and inflexible mandatory life sentence to a murder 
conviction.10 The law has evolved from allowing anger and jealousy related murders being reduced 
to manslaughter, to including fear, at the same time seeing the demise and exclusion of killings with 
a sexual jealousy or revenge motive. Whether or not the law should evolve to include compassion, 
so that such defendants may avoid the ‘murderer’ label and stigma associated with it, will be 
discussed below. 
The Homicide Act 1957 
Before the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 reformed the partial defences of provocation and 
diminished responsibility, both battered women and mercy killers were considered to be outside the 
scope of either defence. Cases of battered women killing their abuser were eventually 
accommodated through judge-made law, with the limitations of provocation being stretched to the 
limits to include slow-burn responses and killings with no immediate threat present. Diminished 
responsibility was also used, for example, in the case of Ahluwalia11, as was the same plea in the 
case for mercy killers. There existed what has been referred to as both an ‘uneasy truce’12 and a 
‘benevolent conspiracy’13 between psychiatrists and the courts to have the partial defence of 
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diminished responsibility successfully raised in cases of mercy killing. The conditions of s2 Homicide 
Act 1957 required an abnormality of mind which substantial impaired mental responsibility for the 
fatal act, as Mackay has observed: 
“For while provocation requires that loss of self-control be tested in the light of a reasonable person’s 
response to extreme circumstances, by way of contrast diminished responsibility is premised on the 
need for the accused to be mentally abnormal”.14 
 A spouse ending the life of their terminally ill partner might well have some kind of mental problem 
such as depression stemming from the hopeless state of affairs, and in such a situation they will 
likely be covered satisfactorily by diminished responsibility. It is just as likely that the act was merely 
generated by feelings of compassion or despair, meaning they will fall outside of this defence. 
Mousaourakis pointed out that if it was a case that evoked sympathy, abnormality of mind might not 
be made out, yet still result in a successful diminished responsibility plea: 
“This explains why the defence has been accepted, despite the absence of clear evidence of 
abnormality of mind”.15 
Not only is mercy killing a category of cases so deserving of mitigation that they are included in a 
partial defence without real scope to embrace them, but they also are granted sympathy by juries. 
This is inexorable proof that mercy killing cases need a defence which adequately covers the 
situation. 
Recognising Fear but Not Compassion 
It is fascinating that the law was changed to cover killings instigated by fear and terror, but not 
despair or compassion. Battered women and mercy killers equally found themselves outside of the 
law when it came to partial defences under the Homicide Act 1957. Why reform partial defences to 
include one but not the other? The law was widely criticised for giving an advantage to killings born 
of anger rather than embracing a range of emotions, but the reforms continue to exclude the 
emotions driving mercy killings. The Law Commission’s recommendations of situations where the 
diminished responsibility defence might appropriately be used included both battered women killing 
their abusers and mercy killing16, suggesting that these cases have some common ground. In fact, 
they might both be more akin to provocation, having similar cumulative effects building up to the 
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fatal event.17 Yet the government found it necessary to reform provocation in a way that would 
promote the inclusion of battered women who kill their abusers, and at the same time push mercy 
killers even further outside of the scope of partial defences.18 Compassion is not alone in being 
excluded. Uniacke has commented that not only are emotional responses such as pity, shame and 
embarrassment to a situation beyond their control not covered in general by partial defences, their 
presence might actually hinder the defences that do exist.19 Compassion is set apart from these 
emotions. It has been described as an altruistic emotion which reflects the moral values and 
emotional sense of the actor.20 It is not a primitive emotion like fear and anger might be described, 
but is not morally inappropriate like the emotion of jealousy. Compassion is generally deemed to be 
a virtue to a person’s character, and so should not contribute negatively to their culpability when 
acted upon. 
The Changes to Diminished Responsibility 
It has been claimed that the diminished responsibility defence was only reformed because it was 
swept up with the changes to provocation21. It was possibly in need of modernisation rather than 
having the scope of the defence itself changed22. The changes to the partial defence were much 
larger than that. It should be pointed out that several academics have claimed that the results of 
section 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which replaces s2 of the Homicide Act 1957, are a 
whole new plea23. It has been described as being narrowed, and in the process: 
“Depriving it of much of its considerable utility as a safety valve on the mandatory life sentence”.24 
If mercy killings were already being shoehorned into a defence which could barely accommodate 
them, and the defence has been significantly narrowed, it is now even less likely that a case of mercy 
killing will be able to meet the requirements of a successful diminished responsibility plea. As Livings 
has noted, mercy killers often display a lack of mental disorder or condition which would adequately 
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meet the criteria of the partial defence, old or new.25 Therefore, using diminished responsibility as a 
partial defence for mercy killers shows an ‘implicit relaxation’ of the law in this area,26 and causes an 
unfair labelling of the defendant as experiencing an abnormality of mind when it was, in fact, the 
suffering of the victim which was an abnormal situation. 
It is possible that the ‘benevolent conspiracy’, and understanding between the courts and 
psychiatrists, might continue to benefit mercy killers, if they stretch the term ‘recognised medical 
condition’ to its absolute limits. Ashworth noted that the Court of Appeal has called this the 
‘unspoken backdrop’ to the new defence27. Fortson also addressed this issue: 
“It is unlikely that the revised definition of diminished responsibility will see the end of a practice that 
has (it is submitted) worked satisfactorily”.28 
If that really is the situation then why not legislate to provide an actual defence for cases of mercy 
killers that is both definite and certain? The reality is that such conduct, continuing with the charade 
of including mercy killers in a defence they do not meet the criteria for, is no different to the 
situation the courts found themselves in over battered women twenty years ago29. Thomas has 
speculated that mercy killings which would previously been deemed worthy of a diminished 
responsibility plea would fail under the new rules30. For example, in the case of Webb31, the 
defendant smothered his wife with a plastic bag and towel after she had taken a number of pills with 
some brandy. She specifically asked him not to let her wake up, and so when she stirred in her sleep 
he proceeded to end her life. She had previously told him on several occasions she might need him 
to do this for her, having become convinced the cancer she was in remission from had returned and 
this would cause her to suffer a stroke. A plea of manslaughter by reason of diminished 
responsibility was accepted, based only on a diagnosis of ‘adjustment disorder’, with the psychiatric 
report reading that the defendant had not recognised his ‘emotional distress’ in the circumstances.32 
This sounds much more like a situation which would fit with an emotional response defence than 
diminished responsibility, and this observation is worthy of note.  
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The new plea of diminished responsibility basically has a three part test. It requires an ‘abnormality 
of mental functioning’33 stemming from a recognised medical condition, which not only substantially 
impaired the defendant’s ability to understand the nature of their conduct, form a rational judgment 
or exercise self-control, but also provides an explanation for the killing. There are three remarkable 
changes here. The first is the change of the word ‘mind’ to ‘mental functioning’. In discussion of the 
bill, a reason for this variation was given: 
“Overall the concept of abnormal mental functioning is better than the current concept of 
abnormality of mind because it emphasises processes rather than a static idea”.34 
The most important aspects of the changes are the inclusion of the term ‘recognised medical 
condition’, as well as the consequential link that the third part of this test provides, which is a 
completely new addition to the plea.  Although it seems, on a fundamental level, to be a much more 
restricted defence than that provided by the Homicide Act 1957, it is possible that it has actually 
been widened to include physical conditions such as sleep disorders and epilepsy.35Meeting the 
criteria of a ‘recognised medical condition’ will be problematic in some cases. Thomas claimed the 
phrase would “exacerbate the difficulty”36, and not only for mercy killers. Cases like Humphries37, an 
abused woman with attention-seeking behaviour, would no longer meet the strict parameters of the 
diminished responsibility defence. As Fortson has pointed out: 
“Concern has been expressed that the revised, tighter, definition of diminished responsibility might 
reduce the potential usefulness of the defence as a means of giving judge’s discretion when 
sentencing persons who have killed but who ought not to be stigmatised as ‘murderers’ “.38 
Mackay has noted that section 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 has some problematic terms 
just like the new loss of self control plea.39Not only this, but the courts have already rejected 
opportunities to provide clarity. In the case of Golds40, the trial judge would not give further 
clarification on the meaning of ‘substantial’ on the grounds that it was a plain word the jury could 
use common sense to determine its meaning. It would have been useful for the judge in this 
instance to try and provide some clarity on the difference between impaired and substantially 
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impaired, much like juries in cases of loss of self-control might need some guidance on the 
distinction between violence and serious violence. 
Can Loss of Control Cover The Cases The New Diminished Responsibility Defence Will Not? 
Previously, an overlap existed between provocation and diminished responsibility as they stood at 
common law prior to the enactment of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. After the case of Morgan 
Smith41, which allowed a mental abnormality to be attributed to the reasonable person to explain 
why self-control was lost in a provocation plea, the overlap was greater than ever. This seems highly 
unlikely now. Not only does the loss of control partial defence restrict merely sex and age to being 
attributed to the reasonable person when assessing tolerance and self-restraint, but the diminished 
responsibility plea now requires that the abnormality stems from a recognised medical condition: 
“Both new pleas are drafted in a manner which militates against possible overlap”42 
This seems regrettable. With the two partial defences contained within the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009 now distant relatives, is it likely that a category of cases previously accommodated by one 
defence could be provided for by the other? It seems more likely that mercy killers will no longer 
have any adequate path to reducing a murder charge to manslaughter. What is most unfortunate is 
that the law does not distinguish between the motives of love and malevolent reasons when it 
comes to murder.43 For a mercy killer to successfully raise the diminished responsibility plea now, a 
diagnosis of a medical condition would be required, and this might not necessarily be the case. 
The partial defence of loss of self-control caters mainly for two emotions – fear and anger. Is there 
room for a killing committed due to despair or compassion? The defendant does not fear serious 
violence, but does fear that a loved one will suffer much pain. It could be said that the circumstances 
of a loved one dying a slow painful death are grave. It could also be said that the defendant may well 
have had a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged, by losing someone before old age. The 
difference is that these emotions are directed towards a disease rather than a person. The 
perpetrator of the provocative conduct is intangible. Livings has argued that the scope of the second 
qualifying trigger is much wider than it is given credit for.44 Rather than being based upon a notion of 
anger, he argues that there is no such stipulation narrowing the new partial defence, and indeed 
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there was not under section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957.45 He speculates that, due to anger not 
being a defined prerequisite for the second qualifying trigger, killings for compassionate reasons as 
well as a range of other emotions might now fit into this category.46 He theorises that loss of self-
control, in its meaning within the context of the new partial defence, is merely a lack of ability to 
behave in a way expected by society, referencing the removal of the suddenness requirement as 
evidence of this determination.47 Also, that each element of the second qualifying trigger can be met 
by a mercy killing case if the legislation is interpreted with a liberal perspective: 
“A person can have a sense of being wronged as a result of circumstance, or as a result of decisions 
taken by people or bodies, and that this can both satisfy the broad requirement of ‘things done or 
said’ and induce a reaction that will fulfil the loss of control provisions”.48 
It is true that the word ‘anger’ is not used to express the criteria for the second qualifying trigger. It 
is an evident implied underpinning to the trigger. The symptoms of an illness may be humiliating and 
distressing, but there are no ‘things said and done’ to direct that sense of injustice towards. A 
terminally ill person might make repeated requests to their partner to end their suffering, but the 
intense emotions experienced by a defendant on hearing these requests are not directed at the 
victim and their having expressed such desires, but at the suffering causing the victim to say it. The 
substance of the second qualifying trigger is predominantly anger, and anger related emotions, and 
while this is not expressed in the Coroners and Justice Act2009, nor was it in s3 Homicide Act 1957, it 
is legislatively inferred.49 Reed has described anger and fear as being “the only emotions 
legitimated”, deemed as deserving a defence under the new provisions, which is an accurate 
argument.50 This is not to say he views this as apposite: 
“Extreme reactions are common under other types of emotional conditions, and there is significant 
psychological literature in support of this proposition”.51 
This was also pointed out during parliamentary debate, with the new defence being described as an 
extension of a defence to those killing from anger to include killing from fear or serious violence 
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too.52 Whilst there is certainly no express exclusion of mercy killings as there is for revenge and 
sexual infidelity killings53, this does not meant the partial defence was designed to include them. 
What would be beneficial is a third limb to this defence, where the qualifying trigger is an 
overwhelming sensation of compassion or extreme grief and the defendant finally snaps. There 
might not appear to be a loss of self-control, and possibly there will be evidence of planning or 
premeditation in cases of mercy killing. The loss of self-control concept is likely to be problematic in 
other categories of cases too, especially battered women. For this reason, it is likely that there will 
be a flexible approach taken to the concept, which could be extended to mercy killings. In both 
situations, the defendant has dealt with an exhausting emotional experience causing great distress.54 
As Simester and Sullivan have noted: 
“Exactly what psychological state represents a loss of self-control cannot precisely be pinned 
down”.55 
Could it be the psychological state of a battered woman who finally acts in fear and desperation to 
protect herself or her children from serious harm or death? Or a man who finally relents and ends 
his wife’s intolerable pain and suffering in a moment of despair? With these categories of killings so 
comparable, it is regrettable that reforms did not encompass both standardisations. A more intrinsic 
look at mercy killing cases shows a parallel with cases of battered women who kill their abusers. 
There will often be many events having a cumulative effect on the emotions and state of mind of the 
defendant. For battered women, this is previous occasions of violence, degradation, torture, threats 
and humiliation. For a man who has a terminally ill wife, it may be previous requests from her, even 
begging, to end her life. It could also be watching her suffer, either due to pain or unpleasant side-
effects from treatment like chemotherapy, with each moment witnessing the victim in these 
condition being a form of provocation in itself. As Taylor states: 
“The illness of the ‘victim’ often manifests itself in numerous acts, often seen by the defendant as 
being humiliating for the victim”.56 
Cases like Inglis only provide proof that English law’s approach to mercy killing is unsatisfactory.57 
Williams had speculated that the old provocation defence could have been stretched to include 
compassion killings just as it was for battered women because of the parallels between the two, 
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because both situations involve emotions other than anger and rely on the juries’ sympathy.58 In the 
case of Cocker, the defendant’s wife suffered from an incurable disease called friedreich ataxia. She 
had become severely incapacitated and the defendant had spent over ten years looking after her. 
Throughout this time, she had told him her life was not worth living and he should end it for her. On 
the fatal evening that he eventually strangled and suffocated her, she had kept him awake clawing at 
his back and repeatedly requesting for him to end her life. The defendant’s leave for appeal was 
dismissed on the grounds that the behaviour he displayed was the opposite of someone losing 
control. The defendant had told the police several times that it was the ‘last straw’.59 That term is 
often associated with a loss of control. It provides further evidence that there is an argument for 
having compassion killings covered by the loss of control partial defence. Uniacke once stated that 
the provocation defence was for someone who: 
“Acts under pressure of external circumstances that generate a powerful emotional response from 
which a wrongful action results”.60 
This statement very adequately sums up the circumstances of the mercy killer just as much as a 
battered woman killing her abuser, or the man who kills the person who raped his daughter. If the 
law could view a person giving up or giving in when it comes to self-restraint as having lost control, 
these individuals would have a chance at an adequate defence. Furthermore, Fortson has speculated 
that loss of self-control is no longer a literal concept under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, with 
focus instead being on the defendant’s circumstances.61 While this would give mercy killers a better 
chance at a defence, the qualifying triggers would still be an impossible obstacle. 
Mercy Killing As a Sentencing Mitigation 
Unsurprisingly, given its reputation for being the proverbial square peg, mercy killing does not sit 
comfortably within mitigation at the sentencing stage either. The case of Inglis proves this point 
exceedingly well.62 After her son was involved in an accident, his mother (the defendant) tried twice 
to end his life, succeeding in her second attempt. She believed he was suffering a living death, with 
no hope for recovery, even though a specialist had informed the family that he might live an 
independent life one day. She injected him with heroin and was arrested for attempted murder, and 
after lying to the police about her intentions in order to be released on bail, she tried again. This 
time she had studied the nurse’s notes to discover at which time she would be able to sneak into his 
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room, brought superglue to squeeze into the lock so the medical staff would be unable to enter the 
room and intervene, as well as a fatal dose of heroin. Her belief was that she alone cared about her 
son, and genuinely believed that she needed to end his suffering. The defendant had a nursing 
diploma, which might have suggested she was well-informed on how to end his life. On the other 
hand, it could be that it gave her a better knowledge and understanding of how deficient her son’s 
life would be prospectively. The judge commented that there was love and not malice in her heart 
when she killed her son.63 It was also noted that there was evidence of stress, anguish and despair. 
Considering this, a defence of diminished responsibility might have been successfully raised. The 
defendant rejected taking this route, favouring a defence of loss of self-control, negated by the 
apparent amount of planning and supposed deliberation. This refusal to plead diminished 
responsibility, in spite of compelling evidence, ended in the defendant being found guilty of murder. 
At the sentencing stage, acts of mercy are a mitigating factor under Para 11(f) Sched 21 s269 
Criminal Justice Act 2003. Clearly, this mother was committing an act of mercy in her own mind. 
However, Para 10 (a,b) lists planning and the victim being vulnerable due to disability as aggravating 
factors. These issues featured significantly in the decision in Inglis 64, and constitutively it highlighted 
that, in terms of sentencing guidelines, mercy killing cases represent a contradiction. This led to 
what Dargue describes as the “only meaningful precedent” born of the Inglis case.65 The Court of 
Appeal gave guidance that in cases of mercy killing, the mitigation provided by Para 11(f) would have 
no validity at all unless Para 10 was ignored, and therefore this should be good practice in future 
cases. Yet again, the law is stretched to include the most deserving of cases because the situation is 
not covered by any specific offence, defence, partial defence or even sentencing rules. 
It is not merely the life sentence attached to a murder killing which is problematic. It would still be 
essential from the point of view of societal values to differentiate between loss of control and 
diminished responsibility killings from murderers.66 Reed has raised genuine concerns over the 
dangers of having only anger and fear benefit from a label other than murder, noting that a more 
‘enlightened’ review of the partial defences is needed in order to be more inclusive to other 
emotions67 As well as having the correct label for the offence to acknowledge the level of culpability 
                                                          
63 Ibid., [32] 
64 Ibid  
65 Dargue n(12) 107 
66 Mackay and Mitchell n(13) 
67 Reed n(9) 186 
involved, the defence should be equally labelled in an accurate manner which reflects the 
circumstances of the case.68 
Thomas and Ashworth are of the opinion that dealing with the situation at sentencing might not be 
adequate, noting that the issue should be dealt with in front of a jury rather than a judge after the 
already stigmatic conviction for murder. This point had also been argued by Reed: 
“The emotional narrative in terms of disproportionate angry reaction to provoking stimuli, 
contextualisation of sexual humiliation or breach of trust, and even extreme grief, despair and 
frustration attached to witnessing the pain and suffering of a cherished individual, ought to be 
evaluated by the jury as moral arbiters”.69 
If the rationale for the killing is purely to avoid the victim suffering, it is extremely harsh to find such 
a defendant guilty of murder, the most heinous of crimes, when the level of culpability is clearly 
reduced. Nonetheless, it would seem that this is all that is available for now.70 
Dealing with a mitigating issue at the sentencing stage has already proved troublesome for New 
Zealand. Over the years before abolition, it was a hot topic, and abolition without replacing the 
partial defence was warned against. Lord Cooke noted that although provocation is only dealt with 
as a mitigation at the sentencing stage for all other crimes, the gravity of murder justifies it being 
singled out as needing to be considered before the penalty stage.71 Brookbanks has noted that the 
result of abolition of the provocation defence can only end in more elaborate sentencing hearings.72 
Cutting the jury out of consideration of this issue is not particularly helpful and does not promote a 
reasonable system of justice by one’s peers. Brookbanks described this as defendants being “forced 
to take their chances with sentencing judges”,73 which is an issue on its own without the fair 
labelling concerns. 
Other Jurisdictions 
In the United States, the Model Penal Code provides a defence for a defendant acting under extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance, as discussed earlier.74 This covers a wide range of emotions, as 
long as there is a reasonable explanation, therefore acknowledging that an ordinary person’s self-
control can be affected by emotions other than those of fear and anger. The jury need only decide if 
                                                          
68 Keating and Bridgeman n(20) 709 
69 Reed n(9) 186 
70 Thomas and Ashworth n(57) 248 
71 R Cooke, ‘The Crimes Bill 1989: A Judge’s Response’ (1989) New Zealand Law Journal 235, 239 
72 W Brookbanks, ‘Partial Defences to Murder in New Zealand’ Chapter 16, Reed and Bohlander, Loss of Control 
and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate, Surrey, 2011)  
275 
73 Ibid., 272 
74 American Law Institute Model Penal Code (1981) S210.3 
there is a reasonable explanation for the emotional disturbance, without speculation over which 
emotions might cause such a disturbance. Such a defence would surely cover battered women and 
mercy killers, as well as the type of situations the second qualifying trigger of the loss of control 
defence is designed to accommodate. Schoenfeld75, in discussing the New Jersey case of Quinlan76, 
contemplated whether or not there is any value or “social interest” in prolonging the life of someone 
who has the chance of a much less painful death. Quinlan was the case of a twenty-one year old girl 
in a vegetative state. Her father asked the courts to appoint him as her guardian so he could 
discontinue the treatment sustaining her. The courts decided that although they had an interest in 
protecting the life of Karen Quinlan, her right to privacy superseded this factorisation. The case 
being discussed in this article is of factual irregularity to the typical mercy killing cases this chapter is 
considering, but some valid points are made. Schoenfeld notes: 
“A gap between the law in words and the law in action is not at all unusual when the public is of two 
or more minds about a matter”77 
In other words, although these situations are not legislated for, they are dealt with by the courts as if 
provision has been made. This is what is meant by the ‘uneasy truce’ of mercy killing and diminished 
responsibility.78 Legislating on such a controversial subject as mercy killing, where protecting the 
vulnerable must be weighed up against ending pain and suffering, would be difficult and possibly 
contentious to the public. For this reason, it is dealt with surreptitiously. 
 It is interesting that the Model Penal Code finds it adequate to refer to emotions as a whole, whilst 
English law has deemed it necessary to specify which emotions are worthy of providing a defence to 
murder. Perhaps it is because anger and fear are considered to be primitive emotions that can be 
almost uncontrollable, while other emotions like guilt and pity are not.79 Wake has observed that 
whilst English law provides several avenues for householders who have killed in defence of their 
home, New South Wales have at times extended the same aid to battered women.80 The Model 
Penal Code is not without criticism. In regards to extreme mental and emotional disturbance, 
Dressler stated: 
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“Although it frees the law from some undesirable common law restrictions, it is a flawed statute”.81 
In fact, the Model Penal Code attracts a similar criticism as the Coroners And Justice Act 2009 in 
some respects. Of the latter, while some areas seem to be too expansive, such as the courts 
willingness to consider sexual infidelity cases despite their express exclusion from constituting a 
qualifying trigger under the loss of control partial defence82, others such as the introduction of the 
term ‘recognised medical condition’ into diminished responsibility seem too narrow. In regards to 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, Dressler observed: 
“Today, some call for “tougher justice” while others want the law to recognise still more excusing 
conditions”.83 
The Model Penal Code’s approach to the partial defence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance is considered a widening of the scope of the provocation defence, giving it a much 
broader scope than the common law provocation defence previously boasted, including a far-
reaching range of emotions capable of causing an extreme emotional response from the 
defendant.84 This is comparable to our journey from s3 of the Homicide Act 1957 to the partial 
defence of loss of control contained within the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The purpose of this 
transition was to allow more emotions than mere anger to account for an emotional outburst, 
therefore giving the defence a much broader approach. Unfortunately, the changes under domestic 
law were not quite as comprehensive.  
In New Zealand, the partial defence of provocation was abolished in 2009,85 leaving such cases with 
mitigating circumstances to the sentencing stage. It has since been recommended on review that 
some form of the provocation defence be reinstated, because dealing with such an issue at the 
sentencing stage, after the defendant has been convicted of murder and labelled as so, is 
inadequate.86With self-defence in New Zealand having an immediacy requirement, it is highly 
unlikely a battered woman killing her abuser would have a defence.87 This is comparable to the 
current situation for compassionate killings under English law, relying on the leniency of the 
sentencing judge after being convicted of murder.88 As previous chapters have concluded, this is 
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completely inadequate. The punishment might fit the crime with more lenient sentencing having 
abolished the mandatory life sentence for murder,89 but the label does not fit the crime. Classifying 
killings which would garner much public sympathy with the same identity as the most callous, 
premeditated killings is undeserved. This is further compounded by the three strikes rule, which 
dictates that a second or third killing by any defendant must carry a mandatory life sentence, no 
matter what the circumstances.90 This would apply equally to a battered woman, a mercy killer, or a 
mother attacking her child’s rapist. 
Conclusion  
English law is inadequate when it comes to providing a suitable partial defence for those who kill a 
loved one who is in pain and suffering, motivated wholly by compassionate reasons. As Kadish put it: 
“Preservation of human life is generally seen as a supreme good in our culture”.91 
To this end, even if consent is given, the act is deemed no less culpable in the eyes of the law. To 
successfully plead the partial defence of diminished responsibility, the defendant must be said to 
have a recognised medical condition. While that may be true for some defendants, it will not always 
adequately fit the case of the compassionate killer. The sole aim of partial defences might be to 
avoid a murder conviction and the mandatory life sentence attached, but it is also important that 
defendant’s are not only labelled with the correct conviction, but also the correct defence. Huxtable 
astutely described use of the diminished responsibility defence for mercy killers as ‘recasting’ and 
inaccurate.92 This truthful statement also recognises that this approach to mercy killings fails to 
recognise the complexity of such cases and how they are morally different to other killings falling 
within the partial defences.93 That being said, Chalmers has argued that the labelling is irrelevant to 
the reality of the situation, as long as the appropriate sentence can be passed to fit the culpability 
level of the crime: 
“Why does it matter so much what the offence is called, so long as the degree of punishment is not 
excessive?”94 
Having a sentence which fits the crime could be said to be the primary concern with cases involving 
mitigating circumstances, however, it is also necessary to have a process that incorporates fair 
labelling because of the stigma attached to the most heinous of crimes. At present we have only 
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murder or manslaughter labels for compassionate killings, which as Rogers has pointed out, is 
lacking a broader consideration of the range of killings they cover. 
Loss of control, as it presently exists, is also incapable of providing a partial defence for mercy killers. 
It is true that the second qualifying trigger, things done or said which constitutes circumstances of 
extremely grave character giving the defendant a justified sense of being seriously wronged, does 
not expressly ask for the reaction to be one of anger. Even so, it cannot be said that a loved one 
asking to die meets the criteria of this trigger. The defendant does not feel a justifiable sense of 
being wronged at the request to die. The defendant’s sense of being wronged is aimed at the 
medical affliction their loved one is suffering from for making them feel like their situation is 
desperate and hopeless. Both Livings and Taylor argue that the situation of a defendant in the case 
of a mercy killer could have led to a sense of being wronged, but the only examples given are 
requests to die and the way in which the illness manifests itself, which can be visibly humiliating for 
the victim.95 Seeing a cherished spouse or family member suffering so badly might cause an extreme 
amount of grief for the defendant, but to say each sight of the victim amounts to accumulating 
provocative conduct capable of invoking the second qualifying trigger to the loss of self-control 
defence is overstating the boundaries of the defence at best.96 Had English law adopted a similar 
framework to that of the Model Penal Code’s extreme mental or emotional disturbance, which may 
arise from any source and does not even require a provocation as such, mercy killing would sit more 
comfortably.97  
Regardless of whether or not the word anger is used to describe elements necessary for successfully 
raising the partial defence based on the second trigger, it is construed to be read that way. Reed 
claimed the second qualifying trigger was to be ‘viewed through a prism of imperfectly justified 
retributive anger’, and a similar idea has been remarked by others98, supporting the validity of this 
contention.99 Edwards described it as the ‘anger’ trigger which could only be founded on moral 
indignation or outrage, neither of which comes close to the experiences of the compassionate 
killer.100 
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If a partial defence of diminished responsibility or loss of self-control fails, both are also considered 
as mitigating circumstances at the sentencing stage.101 This gives defendant’s acting out of fear or 
anger an advantage over those acting from compassion. Even if the defence they are afforded fails, 
they still have the opportunity to have their sentence reduced in the same way as a mercy killer. 
There is simply no explanation for the exclusion of at least a partial defence to murder without a 
diagnosis of a recognised medical condition, other than the concern that some less than genuine 
cases might reach jury consideration.  This could be said equally for loss of control cases, and in that 
situation the jury have been deemed able to sort the sheep from the wolves in most situations. 
A third qualifying trigger added to the partial defence of loss of control is a very promising option for 
reform to satisfactorily include mercy killers. Given that the qualifying triggers of this partial defence 
also rely upon evidence of emotional outbursts, adding a third trigger for compassionate killings 
would be a good fit. Such a provision would certainly need some restrictions to try and seek out the 
genuine cases from those perhaps motivated by selfish reasons. The key elements for such a partial 
defence could be extracted from the Director of Public Prosecution’s policy on assisted suicide102. 
This is a different issue to mercy killing, but much can be ascertained from the list of factors as to 
whether or not to prosecute. For example, factors in favour of prosecution include the victim not 
having the capacity to make an informed decision, a suspect being motivated by something other 
than compassion (such as financial gains), the suspect being unknown to the victim or the suspect 
pressuring the victim to commit suicide. Factors tending against prosecution include the victim 
having reached their own clear and informed decision on wanting to die, the suspect being wholly 
motivated by compassion, the suspect having made an effort to dissuade the victim, and the suspect 
having reported the event to the police and fully assisted them. These guidelines really put 
compassion at the very centre of assisted suicide, and it has even been suggested that this should be 
reflected in the offence rather than just the sentencing guidelines: 
“The insertion of motive into the wording of the offence would have the benefit of providing effective 
notice to the public”.103 
These guidelines, built on a foundation of compassion as a motive, could be moulded into a 
framework for a third qualifying trigger104. For example, the defendant should have had a close and 
personal relationship with the victim, as this is a key element to the emotion of compassion: 
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“Compassion is a complex human emotion. To express it, a person must feel an affinity...with the 
object of his attention, be sympathetically aware of the other’s pain or distress, and desire to alter 
it”.105 
 In tandem with articulated factorisations, the judge having the power to withdraw the defence if 
there is evidence that the defendant was acting for selfish or malevolent reasons, would also be 
crucial. Norrie referred to the judge’s role under the new loss of self-control defence as allowing 
them to make the moral and political decision deemed necessary by the situation106. The judge could 
be relied upon to make such a call in cases of compassionate killings, allowing a principled judgment 
to take place before the issue reaches the jury. The following is an optimal model for a third 
qualifying trigger to be added to the partial defence: 
Unlawful homicide that would otherwise be murder should instead be manslaughter if the defendant 
acted in response to: 
(a) gross provocation (meaning words or conduct or a combination of words and conduct which 
caused the defendant to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged); and/or 
(b)  fear of serious violence towards the defendant or another; or 
(c) watching a loved one suffer from a terminal illness or severe disability 
 In regards to (c), a person must have acted because the victim had either a terminal illness or a 
disease/disability which would substantially impair both life expectancy and the quality of life, had a 
reasonable and genuine belief that the act was necessary to end the victim’s suffering, and been 
motivated wholly by compassion.107  
It is questionable as to whether any form of consent would actually need to be an issue. In cases like 
Cocker, the victim asked to be killed several times. In Inglis, the victim was unable to communicate 
any such consent. Yet both are equally cases of mercy killing, with the defendant believing they were 
acting in the victim’s best interests to end their pain and suffering. The victim’s wishes are not 
overridden if the victim is not in a position to express their wishes. For this reason, the defence 
should not fail if consent was not given, it should merely be stipulated that if it was possible, the 
wishes of the victim should have been ascertained. Of course, if the defendant was acting against 
the wishes of the victim, no defence would or should be available to them. It could be argued that 
gaining any kind of consent in such cases is futile in any regard, as it would be questionable if it was 
genuine. For example, an elderly woman might ask her elderly husband to kill her, not because her 
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pain was so great that she wanted to die, but because her infirmities meant that her husband had to 
provide her with a great level of care and she felt burdensome. Consent is a less significant element 
because the partial defence is based upon the state of mind of the defendant, not the victim. 
Consent would merely mean a case like Cocker, where requests to die from the victim were constant, 
would be a little more clear-cut than that of Inglis. 
Also note the removal of the problematic loss of self-control element, in incompatible concept to the 
situation of the compassionate killer. This is not unique to mercy killing cases. It has already been 
speculated that battered women who kill their abuser will also experience difficulty in pleading the 
very defence designed for them, because there is no outward display of loss of self-control present 
in such cases. It is a behaviour much more readily associated with anger. Cases concerning mercy 
killings and battered women who kill their abuser are not alone in experiencing trouble meeting the 
loss of self-control threshold. Recent cases of men trying to successfully plead the fear of serious 
violence qualifying trigger have also failed on this ground.108 This is because the emotion of fear and 
loss of self-control are not compatible concepts in any situation. It is quite therefore quite obvious 
that the element of loss of control itself might better be left out of the equation altogether when 
reducing culpability based upon an extreme emotional outburst. 
Dargue raised concerns that a new review is needed in regards to mercy killing, and given the 
arguments within this chapter, this statement is supported.109 With cases like Inglis reaching national 
headlines, it might not be a concern the government can shy away from for much longer. It is 
obvious that it needs to be brought in line with other emotional response defences. With safeguards 
in place to ensure the partial defence was used only in the most genuine of cases wholly motivated 
by compassion, a partial defence of killing for compassionate reasons would not be dangerous to the 
vulnerable. Some value needs to be placed on a defendant acting because they did not want a loved 
one to be desperately miserable and in pain any longer, with a premature death being an agonising 
eventuality.110 The situation of the mercy killer is unique because the defendant acts in part to end 
both the intolerable suffering of their loved one, but also to end their own devastation and pain in 
watching them suffer.111 The sanctity of human life is to be valued above all else, but there is some 
merit to the thought that continuing a dreadfully dismal life has very little value at all.112The very fact, 
that the English legal system can declare mercy killers to be murderers by handing them such a 
conviction, then failing to punish those who engage in it in a manner that fits the premeditated 
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murder, shows the shortcomings of the partial defences. The courts are acting as though such a 
partial defence already exists, so why not create one? This issue continues to build in importance, 
with new medical techniques and advancements in treatment meaning terminally ill patients can be 
kept alive longer.113 This situation is in urgent need of remedial legislation to provide a cathartic 
panacea to current ills. It is far beyond the scope of the courts and needs legislative attention. An 
offence or defence designed specifically for compassionate killings would be ideal, but a third 
qualifying trigger would also be a satisfactory solution, short of overhauling the partial defence of 
loss of control altogether in favour of a new emotion based partial defence akin to that of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance. 
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